Labor Law § 240(1) protects a “person so employed” performing the types of work listed in the statute—such as erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building or structure—when the injury arises from the kind of elevation-related risk the statute addresses. Coverage turns more on the task and statutory relationship than on a worker’s job title alone.
Key Takeaways
- A worker’s job title does not by itself determine § 240 coverage; the task being performed matters.
- The work must fit one of the activities listed in § 240(1) and involve the kind of elevation-related protection the statute contemplates.
- Routine maintenance can fall outside § 240 when it does not constitute protected repairing or altering work.
- The defendant must also be within the statutory class, such as a qualifying owner, contractor, or agent, subject to exceptions.
- A covered worker still must prove a statutory violation and proximate cause.
In This Guide
Start With the Work Being Performed
Labor Law § 240(1) lists the work activities to which its protective-device requirement applies. The task at the time of the accident is therefore a threshold issue.
A person who generally works in construction does not automatically have a § 240 claim for every injury, and a person with a less obvious job title can still be covered if the actual task is protected. Time sheets, work orders, testimony, contracts, photographs, and project plans can help establish what was being done.
Which Activities Does the Statute List?
The statute identifies erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, and pointing of a building or structure. Courts have developed substantial case law around what those terms mean in particular circumstances.
The distinction between “repairing” and routine maintenance is especially important. Replacing or altering a component as part of a broader repair can present a different analysis from recurring routine maintenance. The facts cannot be reduced to the worker’s label for the task.
The Accident Must Also Involve a Covered Elevation Risk
Even protected work does not make § 240 apply to every hazard. In Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court of Appeals focused on harm flowing from the application of gravity and a physically significant elevation differential.
Traditional examples include falls from ladders or scaffolds, but the law can also address falling or descending objects when the statutory conditions are met. Slips on a level floor, ordinary vehicle crashes, or other hazards not tied to the elevation-safety purpose of § 240 generally require a different theory.
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Which Safety Devices Matter?
Section 240 identifies scaffolds, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and “other devices.” The question is whether the device or protection appropriate to the risk was furnished and operated so as to give proper protection.
The absence of a particular device is not analyzed in a vacuum. The accident mechanism, task, weight or elevation differential, device condition, placement, anchoring, and available alternative protection can all matter.
Who Must the Defendant Be?
Section 240 refers to contractors, owners, and their agents. A company is not a proper statutory defendant simply because its employees were on the same project. Ownership, contracts, authority, and control over the work may be relevant to defendant status.
The statute also contains an exception for owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work. The exception should be analyzed from the actual property and owner conduct, not assumed from an address alone.
What Situations Commonly Fall Outside § 240?
Examples can include work that is routine maintenance rather than a protected statutory activity, accidents with no qualifying elevation-related risk, defendants outside the statutory class, or cases in which the device and circumstances do not establish a statutory violation.
Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Associates is one Court of Appeals decision discussing both authorization and routine-maintenance issues. Coverage always depends on the specific facts and current law.
Can Worker Conduct Defeat a Covered § 240 Claim?
Worker negligence is not treated exactly like ordinary comparative negligence under § 240, but a worker’s actions can still be decisive. New York cases recognize a sole-proximate-cause defense where the facts satisfy that standard—for example, in some circumstances involving available adequate safety devices that the worker chose not to use without good reason.
The important distinction is between conduct that contributes to an accident and conduct that is the only legal cause because there was no statutory violation that proximately caused the injury.
What If § 240 Does Not Apply?
The absence of a § 240 claim does not mean there is no construction-accident case. Labor Law § 200/common-law negligence, § 241(6), product liability, premises liability, and other third-party theories may still apply, along with workers’ compensation.
That broader framework is explained in Labor Law § 200 vs. § 240 vs. § 241.
Frequently Asked Questions
Quick answers to the questions families ask most.
Are undocumented workers protected by Labor Law § 240?
Does § 240 protect delivery workers?
Is cleaning always covered?
Is routine maintenance protected?
Can I have another claim if § 240 does not apply?
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